Every US auto carrier running on Cambridge Mobile Telematics in 2026.

TL;DR

• ~14 US auto carriers publicly run on CMT as of 2026: State Farm, Progressive, Liberty Mutual, Travelers, USAA, Farmers Insurance, Nationwide, American Family, Erie, Plymouth Rock, Amica, Mercury, Country Financial, Cincinnati Financial. Plus AIG and State Auto via more recent disclosures.
• CMT publicly states its platform serves "21 of the top 25 US insurers." The named-customer wall on cmtelematics.com names 15 of those carriers; the remaining 6-7 are likely confidentially under-disclosed.
• Carrier concentration at the top of the US auto market is unusual for a single vendor. State Farm, Progressive, Travelers, Liberty Mutual, USAA represent ~50% of the US personal auto market; their telematics programs all run on CMT.
• The competitive contrast: Arity (Allstate-owned) covers the Allstate-and-affiliates universe; LexisNexis Risk Solutions provides Telematics OnDemand and other adjacent products. CMT covers most everyone else at the top.
• For carriers building UBI programs in 2026, the implicit choice is "build on CMT" or "stay off telematics" — not "build on CMT vs build on competitor."

The 2026 carrier roster

Carriers are sourced individually on the Cambridge Mobile Telematics tool card with primary URLs.

Tier-1 US auto writers

• State Farm — DriveSafe & Save runs on CMT (largest single CMT customer)
• Progressive — Snapshot built on CMT smartphone telematics
• Liberty Mutual — RightTrack
• Travelers — IntelliDrive
• USAA — SafePilot
• Farmers Insurance — Signal
• Nationwide — SmartRide
• American Family Insurance — KnowYourDrive

Regional + mutual writers

• Erie Insurance
• Plymouth Rock
• Amica Mutual
• Mercury Insurance
• Country Financial
• Cincinnati Financial

More recent additions (2025-2026)

• AIG (US auto book)
• State Auto (now part of Liberty Mutual)
• Geico (DriveEasy program runs on CMT per industry reporting)

Why CMT concentrates this way

Three structural reasons CMT has the tier-1 customer base it does:

1. SoftBank-anchored capital + 10-year head start. CMT raised $500M from SoftBank Vision Fund in 2018, on top of 8 years of prior product investment. That puts it ahead of every smartphone-telematics competitor on smartphone-sensor accuracy, claims-linked driving scores, and crash-reconstruction precision. By the time competitors entered, CMT had multi-year contracts with most tier-1 US auto writers.

2. Smartphone-first architecture wins on cost-per-driver. CMT can run on the carrier's app or on a CMT-branded app; either way, the integration cost is one mobile SDK plus a backend connection. This beats hardware-anchored telematics (OBD-II dongles, beacon kits) on per-driver cost by an order of magnitude. The carriers that wanted to scale telematics to the entire policyholder base, not just an opt-in segment, picked CMT.

3. Claims-data feedback loop. CMT's risk score (DriveWell) is calibrated against actual insurance claims, not just inferred from sensor data. The carrier customers contribute claim data, which improves the score, which makes the score more valuable to the next carrier customer. State Farm's contribution to this loop is disproportionate (largest US auto book) — and helps explain why every tier-1 entrant after State Farm picked CMT.

What CMT's roster says about the US auto-telematics market

The market is more consolidated than the customer-disclosure pattern suggests. Rough sizing:

CMT's named tier-1 share is the strongest single-vendor signal in US auto-tech today. The gap between CMT and the next-best-disclosed competitor is wider than the gap in any other US insurance-tech category.

What this means for new entrants

Three implications:

1. Differentiation has to be on a non-CMT axis. A new telematics entrant cannot win by being "CMT but better at smartphone sensing." That's the dimension where CMT has the strongest moat. Differentiation has to come from a different product shape — usage data products for auto adjacencies (commercial fleet, autonomous-vehicle insurance, ridesharing-specific telematics), behavioural-economics products (gamified driver coaching, family-shared driving accounts), or claims-side products (CMT is mostly underwriting/pricing-side; first-notice-of-loss telematics is less covered).

2. Tier-2 / regional carriers are recoverable ground. The CMT tier-2 list (Erie, Plymouth Rock, Amica, Mercury, Country Financial, Cincinnati) is meaningful but not exhaustive. Smaller regional auto writers and farm-bureau carriers often haven't yet committed to a telematics platform. A focused entrant can target this segment without competing head-on with CMT's tier-1 lock-in.

3. The Arity counter-position is informative. Arity is the one credible counter-position — a tier-1 carrier (Allstate) built its own telematics arm rather than partnering with CMT, and is monetizing it externally. The viability of "carrier-owned-tech-as-a-service" as a pattern depends partly on Arity's external customer growth. As of 2026, Arity has 4 named external customers; CMT has 14+. The gap is durable.

Adjacent reading

• Cambridge Mobile Telematics — vendor card — the full sourced customer list with primary URLs.
• Arity — vendor card — the Allstate-owned counter-position.
• Carrier × vendor matrix — broader graph of who uses what across 600+ documented deployments.

How we built this list

Same methodology as the Phidea carrier-matrix work: aggregate every public source where CMT and a named US carrier appear together — cmtelematics.com customer wall, BusinessWire press releases, carrier-side telematics-program announcements, third-party industry coverage. Each carrier on the tool card has a verifiable URL.

The "21 of top 25 US insurers" claim CMT publishes is a stronger version of what we can document with named-source URLs (~14-16). The unmatched 5-7 are most likely tier-1 nationals whose telematics-program-vendor relationships haven't been publicly disclosed in named form — which is itself a useful pattern for thinking about how the US auto-tech market actually surfaces.